Reply to "Comment on `Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography'"

This is a Reply to the Comment by Lydersen et al. [arXiv: 1106.3756v1]

Practical security bounds against the Trojan-horse attack in quantum key distribution

In the quantum version of a Trojan-horse attack, photons are injected into the optical modules of a quantum key distribution system in an attempt to read information direct from the encoding devices. To stop the Trojan photons, the use of passive optical components has been suggested. However, to date, there is no quantitative bound that specifies such components in relation to the security of the system. Here, we turn the Trojan-horse attack into an information leakage problem. This allows us quantify the system security and relate it to the specification of the optical elements. The analysis is supported by the experimental characterization, within the operation regime, of reflectivity and transmission of the optical components most relevant to security.Comment: 18 pages, 11 figures. Some typos correcte

Gigahertz quantum key distribution with InGaAs avalanche photodiodes

We report a demonstration of quantum key distribution (QKD) at GHz clock rates with InGaAs avalanche photodiodes (APDs) operating in a self-differencing mode. Such a mode of operation allows detection of extremely weak avalanches so that the detector afterpulse noise is sufficiently suppressed. The system is characterized by a secure bit rate of 2.37 Mbps at 5.6 km and 27.9 kbps at 65.5 km when the fiber dispersion is not compensated. After compensating the fiber dispersion, the QKD distance is extended to 101 km, resulting in a secure key rate of 2.88 kbps. Our results suggest that InGaAs APDs are very well suited to GHz QKD applications.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure

Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography

We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly ineffective on any detectors that are operated correctly. The attack is only successful if a redundant resistor is included in series with the APD, or if the detector discrimination levels are set inappropriately